Introduction {#Sec1}
============

Cooperation in human populations is a fundamental phenomenon, which has fascinated many scientists working in different fields, such as biology, sociology, economics^[@CR1]--[@CR6]^, and engineering^[@CR7]--[@CR9]^. In biology it has been pointed out that the emergence of cooperation may be favored by the presence of kin selection, based on the altruistic behavior among relatives^[@CR10],[@CR11]^. Additionally, many theoretical approaches to understand the evolution of cooperation among non-relatives are based on direct reciprocity; in this case it is assumed that individuals can adopt complex strategies that take into account the past history of their interactions with other individuals^[@CR12],[@CR13]^. Although the previous ones are powerful mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation, they don't cover peculiar aspects of human behavior. Indeed, the evolution of cooperation leads to reputation building, morality judgement and complex social interactions with ever increasing cognitive demands^[@CR14]^. These mechanisms are known as indirect reciprocity^[@CR15],[@CR16]^. Other approaches for explaining the emergence of cooperation are based on the presence of norms in a society^[@CR17],[@CR18]^, punishment^[@CR19]--[@CR24]^, synergy and discounting^[@CR25]^, social diversity^[@CR26]^ and positive interactions^[@CR27]^. Also imitative processes, based on conformity, have been found to be effective in the promotion of cooperation within a population^[@CR28]^.

All the aforementioned approaches are based on mathematical models which assume that interactions among players, as well as the update rules of strategies, e.g. when switching between cooperation and defection, are stochastic, and the time evolution of players behavior is described by random variables, e.g. birth-death mechanisms^[@CR12]^ or payoff optimization through imitation^[@CR29]^. Specifically, in these models individuals are constrained to choose between cooperation ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$D$$\end{document}$) in a prisoner's dilemma scenario. Accordingly, the replicator equation is a widely used mathematical model, which represents a deterministic setting ruling the time evolution of the probability distribution of strategies over a well-mixed infinite population^[@CR30],[@CR31]^. However, when dealing with real systems, cooperation may gradually evolve starting from discrete ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$D$$\end{document}$) initial conditions. In this regard, the *continuous prisoner's dilemma* has been proposed as a representative model able to account for different levels of cooperation^[@CR3],[@CR32],[@CR33]^.

Moreover, the presence of graphs of connections among players is typical for real populations, where asymmetric relationships are frequently observed. The evolution of strategies on graphs has been investigated in several studies^[@CR34]--[@CR42]^. Among them, the replicator equation on regular infinite graphs, embedding network reciprocity, has been developed and analyzed in^[@CR15],[@CR43],[@CR44]^. Interestingly, the population structure can be assumed to be the result of reputation-driven mechanisms, thus inducing feedbacks favoring the cooperation among individuals^[@CR45]^.

Recently, the equation for evolutionary game on networks (EGN) has been introduced^[@CR46],[@CR47]^ for modeling the deterministic dynamics of a finite networked population of individuals able to choose strategies in a continuous set. In this framework, people continuously interact over time with all their neighbors, and thus they are able to learn from their environment, composed by friends, colleagues, relatives, and so on. The tools introduced in these papers allow to analyze the dynamics of any single player, and to study more heterogeneous situations, where the initial configuration of the individuals includes partial cooperation. At the same time, the presence of a network of connections among the members of the population introduces some constraints influencing their interactions with neighbors.

In this paper, in order to study the global or partial emergence of cooperation in human societies, we propose to extend the EGN equation described above by introducing self-regulating processes. In cell communication, for example, self-regulation refers to several control mechanisms, such as signal pathways^[@CR48]^ and quorum sensing^[@CR49]^, aimed to maintain the healthy state of living systems. Specifically, inspired by^[@CR9],[@CR50]^, where the importance of internal mechanisms in animal societies is discussed, an additional term is added to the EGN equation, accounting for the presence of feedbacks, acting at the level of any single individual. This integration is in agreement with the fact that "humans seem to have an innate tendency to cooperate with one another even when it goes against their rational self-interest^[@CR51]^". This characteristic is also recognized as a key factor for explaining the human response to monetary rewards or punishments, where the self-interest is not the only mechanism for decision making^[@CR52]^.

However, self-regulating mechanisms, encoded by this innate tendency to cooperate, may be in conflict with social pressure. In fact, the presence of conflicts in human decision processes is widely recognized, as reported by Bear and Rand^[@CR53]^: "In many situations, intuitive and deliberative processes can favor different decisions, leading to inner conflict: Rather than being of a single mind, people are torn between competing desires".

The extended EGN allows us to study theoretically the emergence of cooperation as the result of the conflict between spontaneous internal factors and social pressure perceived by the members of a social interconnected system. The influence of the network topology is also investigated by extensive simulations.

The model {#Sec2}
=========
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The willingness to pursue cooperation as a greater good may follow from internal mechanisms correlated to personal awareness and culture^[@CR51]^, contrasting with the aforementioned selfish processes, which ultimately lead to defection. Reasonably, these mechanisms depend on the current strategy $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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 **Main result 2**. *If, for each player* $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$${x}_{v}(0)\in (0,1]$$\end{document}$*, thus all members of the population will be eventually cooperators*.
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Therefore, under stronger conditions than the one assumed in Main result 1, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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The previous results are related to the global emergence of cooperation, arising when all members of a networked population turn their strategies to cooperation. However, cooperation can partially emerge; for example, some players may exhibit partial levels of cooperation.
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Interestingly, a richer set of unexpected behaviors is observed for the *uncertain players*, belonging to the set $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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First of all, in Fig. [2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"} some prototypical examples of the asymptotic dynamics and the corresponding flows of uncertain players are reported. The solutions have been obtained by solving the ODE system ([6](#Equ6){ref-type=""}) through an explicit Runge-Kutta (4,5) formula^[@CR55]^. This numerical method has been used for all simulations reported in this paper. In the subplots [2A.1](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}, [2B.1](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}, [2C.1](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"} and [2D.1](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}, assuming that the equivalent player reached a fully cooperative ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$${\bar{x}}_{v}$$\end{document}$ moves from 0 (subplot [2C.1](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}) to 1 (subplot [2D.1](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}), the probability for a player to be cooperative increases. Subplots [2C.2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}--[2C.3](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}, and [2D.2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}--[2D.3](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"} depict some examples of the time course of the solutions when playing against unconditional defective or unconditional cooperative equivalent players. Reciprocity mechanisms are observed also for the *S-driven* case, for example, defector-defector (subplot [2C.2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}), partially cooperator-cooperator (subplot [2D.2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}), cooperator-cooperator (subplot [2D.3](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}). Finally, Fig. [2C.3](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"} shows an anti-reciprocal behavior, where $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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In addition to the local dynamics of players, the global behavior of the system is studied by investigating the distribution of cooperation over the whole population. To this aim, extensive simulations have been run using random networks with Erdös-Rényi and Scale-Free degree distributions. For each model, 500 networks of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\beta $$\end{document}$ produces an increase of the number of cooperators.Figure 3Average distribution of strategies and convergence speed. Four different setups are considered: Erdös-Rényi for *T-driven* (**A**) and *S-driven* (**B**) games, and Scale-Free for *T-driven* (**C**) and *S-driven* (**D**) cases. 500 graphs with $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$S$$\end{document}$ are the same as in Fig. [2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}. The average distribution of strategies of the whole population is shown for defectors (red), partial cooperators (orange), and cooperators (yellow). The blue lines represent the convergence speed, experimentally estimated as the inverse of the time required to reach the steady state.

Anyway, Fig. [3](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"} clearly shows that uncertain individuals $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$v\in {\mathscr{U}}$$\end{document}$ are also able to cooperate (light yellow areas), partially cooperate in the *S-driven* game (orange areas in subplots [3B](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"} and [3D](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"}) or defect (light red areas), thus showing that cooperation is possible also for lower values of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\beta $$\end{document}$ required by the theoretical results are usually associated to high costs for the individuals.

Finally, we notice that this phenomenon is stronger for the Scale-Free than for the Erdös-Rényi networks, thus suggesting that the heterogeneity of a network is highly effective in promoting cooperation. Furthermore, the average convergence speed of the system to a steady state, reported by blue lines in Fig. [3](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"}, changes with $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\beta $$\end{document}$s, due to the transition from all defectors to a mixed situation, where cooperators and defectors coexist. Finally, when the number of cooperators dominate the population, the speed increases again.

Game transitions {#Sec4}
----------------

A significant result of this study is that self-regulation induces game transitions, resulting from changes in the structure of the underlying games. To explain this phenomenon, we calculate the equivalent game of player $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$${\bar{x}}_{v}$$\end{document}$, are responsible for these transitions (see the SI document for technical details).

A short recap on two strategy games is useful. Four game typologies are possible: PD game, where defection is the only dominant strategy; Stag Hunt game (SH), where cooperation (defection) is the best response to cooperation (defection); Chicken game (CH), where cooperation is the best response to defection, and vice versa; Harmony game (HA), where cooperation is the only dominant strategy.
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                \begin{document}$$v$$\end{document}$ is uncertain, and transitions may dynamically occur since the equivalent game is also influenced by the behavior of the neighboring players. In the *T-driven* case, when $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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These results are summarized schematically in Fig. [4](#Fig4){ref-type="fig"}, confirming the anti-reciprocal (reciprocal) behaviors already discussed for the *T-driven* (*S-driven*) case.Figure 4SR-EGN equation: schematic representation of game transitions.

Additionally, we remark that the parameter $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\rho $$\end{document}$ increases, thus favoring the onset of game transitions and concurring to explain better the results shown in Fig. [3](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"}, for which the cooperation depends mainly on uncertain players.

The role of network structure {#Sec5}
-----------------------------

As aforementioned, the network structure plays a significant role for the emergence of cooperation. Fig. [5](#Fig5){ref-type="fig"} shows the average cooperation of the whole population, calculated as $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$S$$\end{document}$ are the same as in Fig. [2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}.

Interestingly, except for very small values of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\bar{k}$$\end{document}$, random networks, and especially the Scale-Free networks, foster cooperation more than regular ones. This fact is more relevant for the subset of uncertain players (subplots [5C](#Fig5){ref-type="fig"} and [5D](#Fig5){ref-type="fig"}), suggesting that these players have a crucial role for cooperation.

The presented model allows to study the dynamics of every member of the population, thus enabling to observe whether an individual is changing opinion over time. Moreover, we are interested in understanding the relationship between the dynamics of each individual and that of his equivalent player, thus highlighting different possible behaviors, such as mutual defection, recruiting (cooperate if others cooperate), exploitation of cooperators (defect if others cooperate) and altruism (cooperate if others defect). In order to quantify the difference between the level of cooperation of player $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$${c}_{v} < 0$$\end{document}$ indicates exploitation of cooperators.

Under the same experimental setup used for Fig. [5](#Fig5){ref-type="fig"}, Fig. [6](#Fig6){ref-type="fig"} reports a dot for each player, representing the combination of the value $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\beta $$\end{document}$ is set to 10 for all players. The black lines in Fig. [6](#Fig6){ref-type="fig"} represent the distribution over the whole population of the indicator $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$${c}_{v}$$\end{document}$. Players exhibiting mutual behavior are mainly present in the *S-driven* games, as reported by black lines in subplots [6B](#Fig6){ref-type="fig"} and [6D](#Fig6){ref-type="fig"}. In the *T-driven* case, the population mainly shows oppositing behaviors, and it is split into two groups composed by altruistic and selfish players, respectively (subplots 6A and 6C). It is worthwhile to notice that altruistic players ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$${\mathscr{U}}$$\end{document}$, thus showing a low/intermediate level of connectivity within the network, while selfish players ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$${c}_{v}$$\end{document}$ values is symmetric with respect to 0 for the Erdös-Rényi networks, as shown in subplots [6A](#Fig6){ref-type="fig"} and [6B](#Fig6){ref-type="fig"}, it is asymmetric when the network of connections is Scale-free, as reported in subplots [6C](#Fig6){ref-type="fig"} and [6D](#Fig6){ref-type="fig"}. In fact, Scale-free networks include a higher number of altruistic players as they present a high number of lowly connected players, which concur to activate reciprocal mechanisms.Figure 6Selfishness and altruism within heterogeneous populations. Using the same experimental setup developed for Fig. [3](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"}, for each player, we report a dot representing the value $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$${c}_{v}$$\end{document}$ over the whole population.

Joining the results of Figs. [2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}, [3](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"}, [5](#Fig5){ref-type="fig"} and [6](#Fig6){ref-type="fig"}, we conclude that some individuals are more sensitive and aware of their internal mechanisms, thus becoming cooperative for lower self-regulating factors, and exhibiting a more altruistic behavior. In particular, for the *S-driven* game, these receptive individuals catalyze the others to cooperate.

Discussion {#Sec6}
==========

This paper proposes the analysis of the interplay between social influence and self-regulating mechanisms in continuous models describing the strategic interactions among the members of a networked population. The EGN equation has been appropriately extended to account for a self-regulation feedback, thus giving rise to the SR-EGN equation, which activates stable processes opposing the natural tendency towards defection, typical of the prisoner's dilemma game. Theoretical results ensure that cooperation globally emerges in the extended model, whether self-regulation is stronger than social pressure. Similarly, low self-regulation will let defection spreading out all over the population.

The theoretical results presented in this study are based on the stability analysis of steady states, representing the full or partial cooperative or defective asymptotic behavior of the individuals. The time required for the individuals to reach cooperative states has been also investigated.

From a practical perspective, we found that for intermediate levels of self-regulation, cooperation may partially emerge as the result of different mechanisms: cooperative reciprocity, which activates a recruiting process, and cooperative anti-reciprocity (altruism) arising from the awareness of individuals. These results are coherent with the occurrence of game transitions. Numerical simulations show that the recruiting process is mostly driven by lowly connected neighbors, while awareness mechanisms are prominently caused by highly connected neighbors. Coherently, we find that the Scale-Free topologies are the most cooperative. Indeed, on one hand, they naturally present a high number of lowly connected players, which concur to activate reciprocal mechanisms, while the typical presence of highly connected players (hubs) activates the anti-reciprocal mechanisms. On the other hand, the Erdös-Rényi topologies are less cooperative since they present approximately the same number of lowly and highly connected neighbors. Additionally, the regular networks are in general the least cooperative since the distinction between lowly and highly connected players vanishes. Hence, it can be concluded that cooperation is more likely in heterogeneous network structures.

We want also to highlight that the presence of self-regulation mechanisms entails some costs, which can be reasonably proportional to parameter $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\beta $$\end{document}$. This means that a policy based on the theoretical results reported in this work guarantees that a certain amount of people will unconditionally cooperate, and that, at the same time, they will produce higher costs for the society. The good news is that the same level of cooperation can be achieved by using lower values of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\beta $$\end{document}$, relying on the spontaneous emerging and learning processes of recruiting and awareness, thus reducing significantly the social impact. Heterogeneous populations connected by a Scale-Free connection structure are able to additionally foster the emergence of this "low-cost" cooperation.

In the present work a homogeneous assignment of game parameters $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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